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This paper aims to review the topic of psychic envelopes and to sketch the main
outlines of this concept in infancy. We first explore the origins of the concept in Freud’s
“protective shield” and then its development in adult psychoanalysis before going on
to see how this fits in infancy with post-Bionian psychoanalysis and development. Four
central notions guide this review: (1) Freud’s “protective shield” describes a barrier
to protect the psychic apparatus against potentially overflowing trauma. It is a core
notion which highlights a serious clinical challenge for patients for whom the shield
is damaged or faulty: the risk of confusion of borders between the internal/external
world, conscious/unconscious, mind/body, or self-conservation/sexuality. (2) Anzieu’s
“Skin-Ego” is defined by the different senses of the body. The different layers of
experienced sensation, of this body-ego, go on to form the psychic envelope. This
theory contributes to our understanding of how early trauma, due to the failures of
maternal care, can continue to have an impact in adult life. (3) Bick’s “psychic skin”
establishes the concept in relation to infancy. The mother’s containing functions allow
a first psychic skin to develop, which then defines an infant’s psychic space and affords
the infant a degree of self-containment. Houzel then conceptualized this process as a
stabilization of drive forces. (4) Stern’s “narrative envelope” derives from the intersection
between psychoanalysis and neuroscience. It gives us another way to conceptualize the
development of pre-verbal communication. It may also pave the way for a finer distinction
of different types of envelopes. Ultimately, in this review we find that psychic envelopes in
infancy can be viewed from four different perspectives (economic, topographical, dynamic,
and genetic) and recommend further investigation.
Keywords: body image, infant development, intersubjectivity, psychoanalysis, non-verbal communication, self
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Although it has received relatively little attention elsewhere, the
concept of psychic envelopes is being used in psychoanalysis in
France. The aim of the present article is to undertake a broad
investigative review of this concept, and to specify its main char-
acteristics, particularly as applied in understanding infant devel-
opment. To facilitate this we will focus on four notions in which
the concept is rooted: the protective shield (Freud), the Skin-
Ego (Anzieu), the psychic skin (Bick) and the narrative envelope
(Stern).
THE “PROTECTIVE SHIELD” (FREUD) AND TRAUMA
After considering the working of a “contact barrier” in his (1894)
model of the psyche, Freud (1950/1920) introduced the idea of a
protective function and filter against excitations from the exter-
nal world. This “protective shield” operated to protect the mental
apparatus from external excitations that could overwhelm it, and
so kept the capacity of attention toward the external world intact.
Freud used the metaphor of the external layer of a primitive
organism (an “undifferentiated vesicle of sensitive substance”),
which is sacrificed on impact. Having first (1894) considered
trauma as having a sexual origin, Freud (1950/1894) emphasized
the infant’s need for care. After the First World War he again
revised his theory of anxiety. In 1926 he described the initial
infantile situation as one of “helplessness” (Hilflogsigkeit), where
this can be seen as a sort of generalization of the early risk of
trauma (Freud, 1950/1926). If an infant needed protection, help,
or attention, but lacked a “protective shield,” he would be over-
whelmed. This notion of a protective shield is at the core of the
notion of a psychic envelope.
FREUD’S SUCCESSORS AND THE LIMITS OF MENTAL
FUNCTIONING
Among four of those who followed Freud—Winnicott, Bion,
Marty and Laplanche—we find four different ways to understand
the notions of helplessness and a protective shield or psychic
envelope that keeps the infantile mental apparatus from being
overwhelmed. Each highlighted the role of the mother, but they
characterized the notion of overwhelming differently. I think that
each author could have spoken of a psychic envelope, but in fact
this specific expression was rarely used.
Winnicott (1958, 2005) related psychic conflict to the border of
the psyche, between “inside” and “outside,” in what he described
as an “intermediate zone,” a transitional space. Only a maternal
object that is “good enough” can provide containment for the
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baby’s psyche, which is torn between the “needs of the ego” and
the sexual drives, in order to maintain a “continuity of being.”
The baby develops by becoming the center of gravity of maternal
care, in which a “border membrane” is established between the
“inside” and the “outside.”
According to Winnicott, what we are here calling the “enve-
lope” or “container” is situated at the level of the self, in relation
to challenges of satisfaction of the drives. In his case “overwhelm-
ing” results from an impingement of the instinct upon the self
and the needs of ego. The risk is confusion: between narcissism
and sexuality; between the self and the environment; and between
the inner world and the external world. If the infant’s defenses are
overwhelmed the result is a false organization of the self, called
“the false self.” Premature and intrusive satisfactions on the part
of the baby nourish this “false self,” with the aim of protecting the
secret and real self. This development precludes a “good enough”
differentiation between the self and the environment.
In the context of therapy, Winnicott describes the difference
between neurotics and psychotics as holding between those who
had the benefit of a “good enough mother” and those who had
suffered from impingement. In the latter case, just as the baby
needed to experience good enough caregivers, so the patient
needed to experience a “good enough” therapeutic arrangement.
So he writes that if the couch represents a symbol of maternal love
for the neurotic, it is experienced physically as loving and caring
by the psychotic (Winnicott, 1953). The baby needs to experience
good enough caregivers; the construction of its self depends on
that process.
Bion (1962, 1970) developed a new paradigm in psychoanal-
ysis in terms of the containing function, which we can here also
describe as that of a psychic envelope. He introduced the idea of
a “membrane” in the context of treating psychosis (Bion, 1962).
In psychoanalytic therapy psychotic individuals show a double
confusion: in the delimitation between the conscious and the
unconscious and in that between the patient and the analyst. In
therapy the analyst must establish a membrane between himself
and his patient, and in the patient between the conscious and the
unconscious. Otherwise, as Bion initially observed, verbal lan-
guage might perceived only as an explusive action, so that the
analyst’s interpretation would be received by the patient as an act
without deeper meaning.
Using the notion of projective identification, Bion developed
the idea of a conflictual meeting between the “contained” and
the “container.” There are “beta elements,” which are a priori
incapable of assimilation by the infant mind. They are primi-
tive elements, each “a thing-in-itself,” which must be evacuated.
The capacity of the container to contain these elements enables
them to become mentally experienced by the infant. This “learn-
ing from experience” (Bion, 1962) is represented by the model
of the mother-baby dyad: the beta elements coming from the
baby must be detoxified by the mother, by her alpha function,
her capacity for reverie, so that the baby can eventually benefit
from its initially inaccessible emotional experience. If the mother
is able to contain the infant in this way, then it will be able to
make use of alpha elements in order to dream its fears. If the pro-
cess fails, a “nameless dread” results. After such containment there
is emergence of the mental apparatus with its systemic internal
distinction between conscious and unconscious and its border
with external reality. There is an establishment of a double limit:
conscious/unconscious, internal/external.
We can extract the idea of a psychic envelope from this model.
It can take two forms. In the context of a healthy mother-infant
dyad, the envelope is made up of alpha elements like the “contact
barrier,” following the positive effects of the alpha function on the
creation of links due to the relationship between the container
and the contained. This delineates the conscious from the uncon-
scious; the subject can dream or partake in autoerotic activity.
On the other hand, the failure of this process leads to a confused
state in which the envelope corresponds instead to a “screen of
beta elements,” which is destructive for the subject and his or her
relationships.
Marty (2010) holds that psychosomatic pathology involves a
failure to contain drive excitations. Mentalization (Marty, 2010;
Smadja and Whitford, 2011) is the process of mental transforma-
tion enabling one to manage these excitations. Here the notion of
a “protective shield” provides us with a basis for understanding
the disturbance of the “biological logic” of somatic functioning.
The establishment of the preconscious entails a new organization
of the psyche. In Freud, the preconscious is the part of mental
apparatus where there is a meeting of unconscious representa-
tions of objects and feelings with conscious representations of
words. The absence of a protective shield results in a difficulty in
linking words with feelings, and in “operative thinking” (“pen-
sée opératoire”). Psychosomatic disorders are therefore seen as
consequences of the overwhelming of the protective shield, with
a consequent lack of differentiation between the body and the
mind.
This model of the mother as the protective shield also pro-
vides an approach to the psychopathology of the infant. Kreisler
(1977) classified etiologic influences from a psychosomatic view
into two orientations. One is due to an overload of excitations
that penetrate the protective shield, the other to the deficiency
or absence of the shield, which generates more severe functional
disorders and primary depression. Both are sources of psychoso-
matic disorder. The body becomes disorganized when excitations
cannot become mentally experienced. This is particularly clearly
observed in infants (Debray et al., 2005). With this in mind,
Debray (1998) considers the psychosomatic balance of the father-
mother-baby triad and stresses the need to protect the narcissism
of the parents, which provides the basis upon which the protective
shield is built.
The concept of the protective shield can also be linked to
the balance between sexuality and self-preservation. According to
Freud (1950/1905), the mother is the “first seductress.” Sexuality
is involved in giving care and in the sharing of pleasures with the
baby, both of which invest the mother’s libido in the baby and
induce pleasure in its erogenic zones. Laplanche (1987) stresses
the significant role that “maternal seduction” plays in the “infant’s
anthropological situation.” He regards this as a universal situation
that explains the emergence of the infant’s libido.
This maternal seduction is an enigma for the infant. Indeed,
the mother’s affection partly represents the vestiges of her own
history and adult sexuality, as marked by the repression of her
own infantile sexuality. This enigmatic maternal seduction will
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therefore fuel the infant’s epistemophilic drive, its curiosity and
desire to know, and so the development of its further sexual-
ity and ways of thinking. The other effect of this shared plea-
sure between mother and baby is the baby’s ability to develop
its own auto-eroticism; it can now reproduce this pleasure for
itself. The infant’s libidinal activity thereby produces an erogenic
body, which constitutes primary narcissism. However, for both
these developments to take place healthily an adequate protec-
tive shield is required. If seduction is a necessity for the baby,
not enough or too much can cause traumatic confusions between
self-preservation and libidinal satisfactions (Gutton, 1997).
THE PSYCHIC ENVELOPE AND THE LIMITS OF THE MENTAL
APPARATUS
We have seen that the idea of a “psychic envelope” can be
found in the role Freud assigns to a “protective shield,” and that
this kind of conceptualization is continued, albeit in differing
ways, in the work of Winnicott, Bion, Marty, and Laplanche.
Whichever discussion one chooses, in the absence of such a shield,
trauma is liable to cause confusion in the various limits that
constitute the mental apparatus: within/without, inner/external,
conscious/unconscious, body/mind or self-preservation/libidinal
satisfaction. The multiple dimensions of these limits suggest the
real complexity of the problems to which the concept of a psy-
chic envelope is addressed. We will consider some aspects of this
further via the notions of Skin-Ego, psychic skin and narrative
envelope.
THE SKIN-EGO (ANZIEU): THE FIRST OUTLINE OF THE
NOTION OF AN ENVELOPE
Anzieu found that some patients could not use the tradi-
tional framework of psychoanalysis, in which successful analysis
depended upon the patients’ ability to use verbal language in
free association in such a way as to represent their own traumas.
He initially develops a “transitional psychoanalysis” employing a
“prosthesis-framework” for these cases. As he says
What the patient no longer tolerates in the usual analytical frame-
work reveals the early impediment of the environment which has
left its mark on his Self. In this case, a new framework must be
created by the two contracting parties (the psychoanalyst and the
patient), an intermediary between the traditional psychoanalyti-
cal framework, which remains the objective of the psychoanalyst,
and the prosthesis-framework, precisely adapted in order to com-
pensate the shortcomings of the patient, who claims it explicitly or
implicitly (Anzieu, 1979, p. 203, author’s translation).
The psychoanalyst taking Winnicott’s perspective must initially
be able to listen and to take into account the “needs of the Ego.”
The traditional framework, based as it us on the patient’s ability
to use language on the couch, does not enable this. For example
lying on the couch without seeing the analyst might exacerbate
the patient’s primitive anxieties, particularly his paranoid fears,
rendering language as used in this position an insecure medium.
Thus Anzieu recommended adjusting the framework when he
developed the notions of the Skin-Ego and the psychic envelope.
For instance, the transformation of the setting to a “face to face
situation” may make the patient more confident. The patient can
then experience recognition in the psychoanalyst’s face, and can
read there the relations between words and affects. All the man-
ifestations of the body can then be assigned meaning, and, of
course, the maternal transferences are more acute. Interpretations
were also adjusted to the patient’s level of symbolization. When
the patient cannot put early traumas into words the psychoanalyst
may follow the recommendation of Freud (1950/1937) and offer a
construction that helps him to imagine the situation. The “group
situation” (Kaës, 2007) is another adjustment of the framework.
Anzieu’s idea was to rework the standard cure to cater for the
existence of a more archaic, more corporeal Ego. The primary
differentiation of the ego was seen to emerge from the senses of
the skin, which in turn would take on new meaning at the psy-
chic level, inside a symbolic system. In this Anzieu opposed the
idea that Bowlby could be said to have introduced a new drive
that would precede the oral libido; on the contrary, he consid-
ered the two dimensions to be complementary: “in my opinion,
the relation between oral drive and the skin constitutes the pro-
totype of all the figure-ground relations” (1974a, p. 152, author’s
translation). It is the weakness of the Skin-Ego that leads the psy-
choanalyst to adopt a framework that is less reliant on language.
It is important to consider this methodological context to under-
stand both the emergence and the interest of the notion of an
envelope.
When explaining the Skin-Ego, Anzieu (1989) also relied on
knowledge developed when working as a psychologist in a med-
ical ward (the “envelope” is an item of the Rorschach scale). He
refers to the work of Brazelton, who describes how the infant
needs an envelope after birth to maintain its homeostasis. The
core of his conceptualization relies, however, on the work of
Winnicott, with the biological foundation of the Skin-Ego being
related to the “needs of the ego.” His concept concerns the devel-
opment of psychological functions that are closely related to the
physiological functions of the skin: those of barrier, surface of
meaning and filter (Anzieu, 1974b). Some eight or nine fur-
ther functions were proposed and developed later (Anzieu, 1989,
2011).
If this development is impaired, then the patient’s attention
becomes focused on what Anzieu (1990) “formal signifiers” as
opposed to linguistic signifiers. These are perceptual, sensory
or kinetic traces related to traumatic failures in maternal care.
(Anzieu gives the example of “a bag gets a hole in it,” “a skin which
shrinks,” etc.). In therapy the characteristics of the Skin-Ego are
taken into account by identifying these “formal signifiers”1.
PSYCHIC ENVELOPES
The envelope concept follows on naturally from Anzieu’s
Skin-Ego. The metaphor of the “Mystic Writing-Pad” (Freud,
1950/1925) is used to define the two sheets of the Skin-Ego: an
external face which receives inscriptions but does not store them,
which resists destruction but remains rigid; a malleable inner
face, which stores the inscriptions, the meaning. The two sheets
of the Skin-Ego become envelopes. This double aspect of the
1This conceptualization is related to the problem of language and of inter-
pretation. Compare Rosolato’s “demarcation signifiers” (Rosolato, 1992) or
Aulagnier’s “pictograms” (2011).
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envelopes, the external face of the inscription and the inner face
of the protective shield, makes it possible to consider various psy-
chopathological configurations depending on the failure of the
layers.
The “prohibition to touch” (Anzieu, 1989) explains the struc-
turing of very early relationships, before the oedipal prohibition.
It indicates how the infant quits the fantasy of a “common skin”
to accede to the Skin-Ego. The first forms of care are the most
tactile; the switch to verbal representation requires a distancing,
a prohibition, which enables the baby to abandon the “body-to-
body exchanges” with mother, so that it can speak and becomes
individualized. On this basis, the oedipal prohibition will become
possible.
Anzieu showed that this prohibition has a double trigger: ini-
tially it relates to the skin and to touch. Later, when the toddler
has acquired abilities which lead it to actively explore things and
its surroundings, it more specifically concerns what the hand can
touch. The first form of prohibition helps the infant to abandon
the “intra-uterine fantasy” and to reach the “fantasy of a common
skin.” Due to the second form of prohibition, the child aban-
dons the “fantasy of common skin” and acquires a Skin-Ego, an
inner world that can contain psychic conflicts without the risk
of spilling over. It can be considered a “symboligenic castration”
(Dolto, 1984): it is a prohibition that produces a representation,
a symbolization, instead of an “amputation” of the body image.
The infant can have access to a representation of the differentia-
tion between his body and the mother’s body, a symbol is created,
it is positive to his development. On the other hand, the failure of
this process leads to a confused state of the infant’s body image,
the infant cannot imagine the differentiation, the prohibition is
felt as an intrusion, as an attack. As the incest prohibition at the
time of oedipal complex, the “prohibition to touch” could have a
helpful role at the time of the primary development of the self.
Envelopes are constructed during the earliest maternal care-
giving. They are initially sensory like those related to the senses of
smell, touch, thermal perception or sight. Following René Spitz
(1965), who distinguished the first proximal senses (touch and
smell) from the distal senses (sight), Anzieu advanced the idea of
the precession of the touch and smell envelopes over the one for
sight. The works which he directly inspired are focused on sensory
qualities such as vision, sound and voice (fromAnzieu et al., 1993;
Gimenez, 1994; Lecourt, 2004).
Anzieu puts two analytical rules—the rule of abstinence and
the rule of free associations—and two sheets in relation to each
other. The abstinence is in relation with the inner side of the pro-
tective shield and the rule of free associations with the outside
of the inscription. The progressive differentiation of these two
sheets allows the neurotic to use the classic framework and its
rules (as described before by Winnicott) whereas disturbances in
the differentiation or the establishment of these sheets requires an
adjustment to the framework to adapt it to the patient’s abilities
to symbolize.
Anzieu was also a great theoretician of group psychoanalysis.
He made a transition from psychosocial approaches to psychoan-
alytic approaches to the group. The group envelope concept was
not initially part of his thinking; he introduced it later and it thus
featured only in the second edition of his book on groups (Anzieu,
1981). His theory shows how the limit between the inside and the
outside of the group is constituted. Taking a fresh look at Freud’s
text Freud (1950/1921), he showed that this limit was based on
the ideal of the Ego as shared by all those participating in the
group. It is not to be confused with a fantasy and Anzieu gives
it a special, structural place. In the same way as the Oedipus
complex can organize a group around a symbolic law, the group
envelope organizes it according to the filters and filtered content
between the inside and the outside of the group. It thus designates
a “meta-organizer” of the group’s imaginary life. This notion is in
common use in group theory.
CONCLUSION: A TOPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE ON EARLY TRAUMA
Anzieu’s conceptualization explicates the relationship between the
idea of a protective shield and trauma. The theory of a Skin-Ego
made it possible to establish the concept of a psychic envelope.
The mark of early childhood traumas can be seen in the flaws
of the adult’s Skin-Ego, in the quality of the adult envelopes.
Whereas in Freud the notion of a traumatic overflow was mainly
envisaged according to its intensity, Anzieu emphasizes the topo-
graphical dimension of trauma. Trauma must be investigated for
the Ego to be reconstructed, so that it can recover its capabilities
for synthesis, thinking, and using language.
This model, primarily constructed from abnormal adult psy-
chology, is a powerful tool for considering abnormal child and
infant psychology. However, Anzieu’s infant remains a “baby
reconstructed” from adult analysis. This leaves a number of ques-
tions unanswered. For example, how do these various types of
envelopes fit into place? Is the skin the only “model” of the exis-
tence of envelopes? Can we isolate in the infant an envelope
centered on a single, visual, tactile or olfactory meaning as Anzieu
does? With the infant, do we not rather see the development of an
intermodality of all the senses, even earlier than Anzieu suggests?
We will now approach Houzel’s conceptualization, which
introduces a notion of an envelope that can be regarded as
detached from the metaphor of the skin. After this we will con-
sider Stern’s re-conceptualization, with the aim of establishing the
envelope as a narrative.
THE “PSYCHIC SKIN” (BICK) AND THE
CONCEPTUALIZATION OF THE INFANT ENVELOPE (HOUZEL)
Houzel can be credited with truly establishing the concept of the
“psychic envelope” (1987, 2005, 2012). He connected it with the
early contributions of Bion, Bick and post-Kleinian psychoana-
lysts, so enabling it to be related more directly to the infant’s body
image.
Following the work of Klein on the internal world of the baby,
Bick highlighted the importance of the first “psychic skin.” She
showed the importance of the containing function of the mother
for the earliest creation of the baby’s self (1968, 1986). What
we are calling the “envelope” results from the introjection of the
mother’s containing functions.
“The thesis is that in its most primitive form, the parts of the per-
sonality are felt to have no binding force among themselves and
must therefore be held together in a way that is experienced by
them passively, by the skin functioning as a boundary. But this
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internal function of containing the parts of the self is dependent
initially on the introjection of an external object, experienced as
capable of fulfilling this function. Later, identification with this
function of the object supersedes the unintegrated state and gives
rise to the fantasy of internal and external spaces. Only then the
stage is set for the operation of primal splitting and idealization of
self and object as described by Melanie Klein. Until the containing
functions have been introjected, the concept of a space within the
self cannot arise. Introjection, i.e., construction of an object in an
internal space is therefore impaired. In its absence, the function of
projective identification will necessarily continue unabated and all
the confusions of identity attending it will be manifest.” (1968, in
Briggs, 2002, pp. 55–56).
This process relates to the very first weeks of the newborn
baby’s life. When the infant is overwhelmed by primitive anx-
ieties, its psychic space is threatened. Bick (1968) introduced
the idea of the “second skin,” which we can call a “defensive
envelope.” This defense allows the baby to fight against the
fear of not being contained, the terror of a never- ending fall.
This is all about a kind of “self-containment.” The Ego defends
itself against the fear of “non-integration” which generates catas-
trophic anxieties, by a “pseudo independence” vis-à-vis the
object.
This “psychic skin” is obviously connected to Anzieu’s Skin-
Ego. In fact, in his writings Anzieu himself quoted Bick. There
is however a difference of perspective between the two. Bick was
working with children and her concept fits infancy better than
Anzieu’s, which came from working with adults. The metaphor of
the skin is not used in the same way either. Bick tried to show how
to understand the development of the mental space in infancy.
Those who followed in her footsteps, Meltzer, Tustin and Haag,
went on to explain connections between this mental space and
the body.
THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE MENTAL SPACE
Meltzer (2004) introduced the idea of “a geography of fantasy,” a
mental space that is built in infancy through the encounter with
the other and in relation to one’s own body. The psychic world
can be internal (the self) or external (the others), the body can be
experienced as having an interior and an exterior. This space has
several dimensions. The development of these different dimen-
sions depends on the ability of the subject to think, love and
improve experiences through contact with others. In line with the
work of Klein, Meltzer particularly studied the negative effects of
intrusive projective identification, especially on internal objects.
According to Bion, when the object is an inadequate container,
the baby risks pathological identifications concerning parts of his
own body.
In line with Bick and Tustin, Haag (Haag, 1990, 2004, 2006;
Dubinsky and Dubinsky, 2005) examined this “architecture” by
showing the importance of the first folds in the skin of baby’s
body; at the bodily level, these folds duplicate the ties that the
baby has with its mother. Thus, for example, the unification of the
split around the sagittal axis between the two halves of the body,
the right side and the left side, takes up the “container-contained
relationship” which the baby has built with its mother. By estab-
lishing the junction between its two hands, the right one and the
left one, the baby “carries” its left side by its right side, in the same
manner that its mother had carried her baby.
This “geography” of body image is thus highly dependent on
the introjection of the mother- baby relationship or, more pre-
cisely, on the boundaries which the infant determines for its
psychic environment. Haag (1993) specifically studied the impor-
tance of the interpenetration of gazes and the function of a “back-
ground object.” In eye to eye communication with its mother, the
baby’s eyes plunge into the depths of her eyes. In this movement
of projections “in the head” of the other, the baby encounters a
bottom, a capacity, an enigma, a mindful and attentive presence.
A very small variation in emotion is returned compared to what
was projected. This “returning loop” is at the origin of the feeling
of being. The presence of a thinking mother limits the amount
of projected emotional variation, and this enables the closing of a
“returning loop,” and thus the possibility of the baby’s linking its
own projections to the returning perception.
The enclosed space or background to the encounter constitutes
a sort of primitive mirror for the baby. Without this experience,
the baby is at risk of losing its limits and of resorting to halluci-
nations, stimuli from hard objects, or the like, in an attempt to
suppress the anxiety of disappearance, much in the same way as
is the case in autism. The “returning loop” represents a primitive
form of the back and forth-movement from the core of the self.
Since this experience is continually repeated, the first psychic con-
tainer also has a rhythmic structure. It the “hearth” from which
the baby can perceive the external world as different to the inter-
nal one. Haag linked these “returning loops” to Stern’s narrative
envelope, as we will see later.
THE INFANT ENVELOPE AS A STABILIZER
Houzel took Anzieu’s work as a starting point, but added
approaches of Bick, Meltzer and Tustin from England and that
of Haag from France. He defines the psychic envelope as: “the
demarcation line between the internal world and the external
world, between the internal mental world and the mental world
of others” (1987, p. 24, author’s translation). He emphasizes the
dynamic aspect of this concept: “The psychic envelope should not
be conceived in a static way, but rather as a dynamic system, that
allows for a synthesis of dynamic and topographic points of view,
i.e., the synthesis of the concepts of force and shape.” (1987, p.
40, author’s translation). He uses the concept of “attractor” from
catastrophe theory to show this dynamic aspect:
The concept of attractor allows Bion’s and Bick’s descriptions to be
better understood, making the nipple/breast the container of the
primitive oral impulses. The nipple/breast does not contain in the
sense of a recipient, but allows a stable shape to be provided and
therefore a meaning, to the baby’s oral impulses; it is an attractor
for the dynamic system of these impulses, in this sense, it contains
them (1987, p. 41, author’s translation).
Houzel extended this account to the level of the family group. The
family envelope is a. . .
. . . group structure common to the members of the same family,
which ensures the succession of generations and their differen-
tiation, which allows for the complementarity of maternal and
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paternal parental roles, which guarantees the constitution of the
basic identity and of the sexual identity of each of the children,
and which finally contains in respect to the same filiation all the
members of the family and leads them to share the same feeling of
belonging (2005, p. 136, author’s translation).
In this perspective the psychic envelope is thought of as integrat-
ing the mental work of both maternal and paternal containment.
The difference between the generations and between the sexes
allows for the stabilization of the family envelope. In particular,
life threatening issues of transgenerational repetitions in moth-
ers with babies suffering from deprivation, which Selma Fraiberg
et al. (1975) described as “ghosts in the nursery,” are to be con-
tained and transformed by the family envelope. When families
encounter difficulties, in cases of deprivation, negligence or place-
ment of children in care, for example, professionals must work
together to reconstruct the stability of the envelope so as to guar-
antee and protect the identity of all the members of the family
and especially that of the suffering children. Houzel thus intro-
duced the idea of an “extended envelope” (2005, p. 140) when
the various professionals around the family work together to help
the family to be less subject to the influence of massive projective
mechanisms and transgenerational pathologic repetition.
CONCLUSION: THE DYNAMIC CONTAINING FUNCTION OF PSYCHIC
ENVELOPES
Houzel worked toward a second definition of psychic envelopes,
which takes into account the mental life of infants. After the topo-
graphical perspective developed by Anzieu and the emphasis on
narcissism, he insists on the dynamic and drive point of view
in the construction of envelopes. Pathology related to envelopes
derives from failures in the containing function of the mother,
the parents, the family at large and/or of health workers.
Observational studies of both infancy and autism illustrate
how the envelope concept can be related to the development
of the infant’s body image. Haag describes this development
in its various stages and processes. It may also be of inter-
est here to cite the work of Dolto (1984) on body image.
Even though she does not explicitly refer to an envelope, she
clinically describes processes similar to those noted by Haag,
though using a conceptual framework derived from Lacan.
Likewise studies of parental interactions and projections into
infants show possible paths for exploration of this containing
function.
The singular fantasies of the baby result from a dynamics that
is due to the containing role of the mother. The behavioral inter-
actions of mother and baby carry the imprint of fantasy and
unconscious mental life (Kreisler and Cramer, 1981; Lebovici and
Stoleru, 2003). The baby receives a “family mandate” (Lebovici,
1998), which can confirm expectations or repair dramas from
previous generations. The shade cast by the mother reflects the
“violence of her interpretation” (Aulagnier, 2011). The tiniest
detail in interaction can become the object of fear, of unconscious
inductions, and can indicate the fantasies of themother. The birth
of a child initially upsets the reference of identification of each
family member. Parental projections are more or less constrain-
ing, with more or less weight being exerted on the baby. Manzano
et al. (1999) and Palacio-Espasa (2007) described the various
“narcissistic scenarios” of parenting according to the rigidity of
the parents’ projections into the baby. The baby identifies itself
with the place that the parent gives it and that place is more or
less constraining. The conception of the infant’s psychic enve-
lope can be used to investigate how the infant subjectivises such
experiences.
NARRATIVE ENVELOPES AND THE
“SCHEMA-OF-BEING-WITH” (STERN)
Stern (1993, 1995) introduced the idea of a “pre-narrative enve-
lope” to describe the infant’s interactions with its mother. The
infant’s experience was seen to result from a network of schemas
of “being-with-another,” including narrative envelopes, scripts,
and sensorimotor, perceptual or conceptual schemas. By a process
of “re-figuration,” these schemas would give meaning to represen-
tations experienced as fantasies, memories or autobiographical
representations (1997, p. 132).
Stern especially emphasized the various elements that consti-
tute the experiences of the infant, in particular the affects and
what he called “temporary feeling shapes.” This notion refers to
a semantic unit. For example, when the infant acts on motives
(drinking when thirsty, receiving and adapting to bad news), this
is followed by changes in pleasure, emotion and the level of moti-
vation or satisfaction. These changes occur over time with an
emergent feeling, which is new, subjectively experienced, singu-
lar and complex. This framework of feeling makes it possible to
generate the contour and structure of the baby’s experience. All
of these processes would be at the base of the “internal work-
ing model” that constitutes the internalization of the process of
attachment.
Here there is an evolution from the nonverbal time of emo-
tional intrigue to the time of verbal representations. The idea of
“temporary shape” gives way to “present moments” (Stern, 2004)
which are very short, from 1 to 10 s. When musical notes become
a tune after the 3rd or 4th note, there is a retroactive effect of uni-
fication of what has already occurred (“the past of the present”),
and paradoxically this makes it possible to make a leap, to imag-
ine what will happen, by passing on to “the horizon of the future.”
According to Ricoeur (1992) psychic time is based on intrigue,
the notion of intrigue organizes separate events into an imme-
diately deferred action. This gives shape to feeling; it produces a
line of tension that links the schema of affect to those of narrative.
Stern regarded time as a kind of sixth sense, something trans-
modal that adds a certain form of sensuality to the other senses.
This conceptualization of infant psychic time can be compared
with other works on infant rhythms. Indeed, it could underline
the specificity of a very early process of transformation.
These works also led to a model of therapeutic change
in which narrative envelopes have a “language” function. The
Boston Change Process Study Group Model (Stern et al., 2001;
Bruschweiler-Stern et al., 2002) investigated therapeutic change
within implicit or procedural memory. This was in contrast to
traditional interpretative change, which was made possible by the
emergence of declarative or autobiographical memory with ver-
bal language. The envelope, as a narrative, can be seen as a kind
of primary language.
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STEPS IN DEVELOPMENT AND COMMUNICATION AS MEDIATED BY
DIFFERENT FORMS OF ENVELOPE
Communication successively takes on different forms, related to
the development of the self. Communication becomes more and
more complex at each step, and also becomes more precise and
more abstract. There is an enormous amount of literature on
this subject. Different types of studies illustrate the various stages
traversed by, for example, the sense of self (Stern, 1985), by inter-
subjectivity (Trevarthen and Aitken, 2001), by the conscience
(Weinberg and Tronick, 1994; Rochat, 2003) and by emotional
and social development (Greenspan et al., 2001). These stud-
ies could, in our view, provide components for the emergence
of infant envelopes. If we consider that, according to Houzel,
there is a stabilization of the envelope between the baby and its
mother, then we can see each stage of development as a sort of
stabilization, due to the maturation of the baby.
The work of Stern (1985) gives us a matrix for this develop-
ment. He shows how the self becomes more and more complex
while giving the baby new vehicles of communication with others.
The baby feels its authentic self at the same time that it perceives
the potentiality of an outside, of another mind. Being attentive
to oneself presupposes being able to perceive outside oneself.
Intrinsically, the self is dependent on the quality of caregivers and
it is built inside the relationship that the baby develops with its
mother.
While defining these meanings for the self very precisely, Stern
did not seek to establish correspondences between different com-
municative methods of the infant and different stages or modes in
the envelopes. It is possible to identify different stages that consti-
tute various modes of being in communication with oneself and
others (Mellier, 2012). Psychic envelopes may be distinguished
according to these various types of operations that involve inter-
subjectivity, maturation and the corporeity of the baby. Various
forms of envelope could be distinguished through the baby’s
communicative modes. The stabilization of its mode of commu-
nication seems due to the fact that the baby shares and associates
in a privileged, but non- exclusive, way, particular components
of its experiences: sensations, emotions, states of mind, actions,
words and then language. Step by step the baby learns how to
share and to associate its experiences until it reaches the point of
abstraction at which it begins to talk. In this process its Skin-Ego
is created little by little, by successive traces, by the unfolding of its
experiences. So the development of the sense of self (Stern, 1985)
guides us toward four possible forms of envelopes in infancy:
(i) Envelopes with a sensory basis. Stern describes the “emer-
gent self” in the field of the emergent interpersonal bond;
initially the infant has to cope with difficult experiences, with
a world of perceptions, of sensations, which it must decipher.
Trevarthen (2001) underlines the innate intersubjectivity of
new-born, what we call “primary intersubjectivity.” Rochat
(2003) introduces the idea of an “ecological self”: the infant
is feeling its body as an entity different from its environ-
ment. This stage is deeply connected with the construction
of the “psychic skin” established by Bick (Mellier, 2010). The
breast is the first attractor between the mother and her baby
(Houzel, 2005). Perceptions are constructed at the same time
in the self and the psychic space. For Anzieu (1989) this is the
first step in forming the Ego-skin on the basis of sensory per-
ception (touch, smell, vision). For the infant this is the first
differentiation from the mother’s psychic space.
(ii) Envelopes with an emotional basis. According to Stern, after
the “core self” (at about 2 or 3 months) we enter the field
of the interpersonal bond: the baby enters the “immedi-
ate social world” with its mother (at about 7–9 months) by
learning in a quasi-choreographic way it part in the subtle
movements between it and its mother. Trevarthen (2001)
introduces the concept of “proto-conversation” which will
become on what Stern calls “affect attunements.” This is the
beginning of “narrative envelopes,” and is connected with
the “fantasy of common skin” described by Anzieu, and
the emergence of Kleinian paranoid-schizoid and depressive
positions. Spitz’s second organizer, the fear of the stranger,
is always a pertinent point. For the infant this is the sec-
ond differentiation from themother and the parental psychic
space.
(iii) Envelopes based on “state of mind.” According to Stern, this
is the “subjective self” within the intersubjective interper-
sonal field (secondary intersubjectivity): the baby discovers
that it has a mind and that others also have a mind (Theory
of Mind). This is a great step in development, according to
Bowlby (1988) that of the internalization of attachment fig-
ures. It is at this stage that we can imagine the beginning of
the second form of the “prohibition to touch” introduced by
Anzieu. For the infant this is the third differentiation from
the mother and the parental psychic space.
(iv) Envelopes based on actions that produce representations.
According to Stern, this is the “verbal self” (at about 15
months) within the field of the verbal interpersonal bond.
With words, the baby discovers that sound symbols open
up new prospects to the imagination and communication
while bringing into question its former non-verbal worlds.
Trevarthen’s (2001) work is interesting because he stressed
the importance of the companion in infancy and of coopera-
tion. We can also recognize the third organizer, the utterance
of “no,” as stressed by Spitz, and the complexity of the pas-
sage to verbal language (Vivona, 2009). Later, the child takes
a major step into the “world of stories” (Stern, 1990): the
child is able to imagine its own story in relation to what
happens to others. For the infant, this is the fourth differen-
tiation from the mother and the psychic space of the closed
family.
CONCLUSION: THE QUESTION OF GENESIS OF ENVELOPES IN INFANCY
The hypothesis that different forms of envelope mediate differ-
ent stages of development and communication requires further
work. Many questions remain unanswered, for instance how can
we explain the change from one mode of communication to
another, from one envelope to another? Is it merely the result
of biological maturation? How do aggressive impulses affect the
process of differentiation? Is development independent of rela-
tions within the parental dyad? Is it possible to talk of develop-
ment in infant envelopes without making development a central
component?
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This last question raises others. According to Green (Sandler
et al., 2000), empirically-based developmental research is in
danger of destroying the specificity of psychoanalysis and risks
leading to oversimplification. Again, psychoanalysis and neuro-
sciences are two different fields (Bazan, 2011), two different ways
of explaining the same phenomena, but real questions remain
concerning the importation of a concept from one field to the
other. The successful conceptualization of psychic envelopes in
the field of psychoanalysis depends on one major question: how
can we envisage the earliest form of an infant’s unconscious
world? There is no space here to deal with this thorny prob-
lem, but have no doubt that it cannot be ignored (Roussillon,
2011). Keeping psychic envelopes within the analytical frame-
work depends on identifying the psychic conflicts at work for the
infant in its relations as well as the processes by which they are
elaborated.
TOWARD A PROGRAM OF ELUCIDATING THE ROLE OF
PSYCHIC ENVELOPES
As we conclude this review of the literature, we hope we have
shown that the psychic envelopes of an infant can be helpfully
defined along the lines of economic, topographical, dynamic and
genetic perspectives. The point of departure for our review was
the Freudian idea of a “protective shield,” which has undergone
the series of developments we have charted via the concept of
a psychic envelope. Throughout our review, we have illustrated
and discussed the concept of psychic envelopes in the infant and
posited the primary economic, topological, dynamic and genetic
issues pertaining to this concept. The question of different types
of envelopes remains open to discussion as does the question of
their transformation, especially in pathological cases. This con-
cept could be further elucidated through work on infant body
image and the links with its parents and caregivers. We hope,
through this review of the literature, to have laid the foundations
for future research in this crucially important field.
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